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I. INTRODUCTION
Policies and regulations from the past decade underscore the need for
strong constitutional safeguards in removal proceedings, which are admin-
istrative proceedings where an Immigration Judge adjudicates whether a
noncitizen should be deported from the United States under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA). Deportation has accelerated; the Obama
Administration has removed nearly 400,000 noncitizens in each of the last
three years.' Congress and the Executive have limited appellate review of
final orders of removal 2 and sharply curtailed avenues of discretionary re-
lief.3 Immigration detention has increased significantly; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained a record total of 384,000 noncitizens
in 2009, and 363,000 noncitizens in 2010.4 Immigration law also has become
1. Julia Preston, U.S. To Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at Al
("The Obama administration has removed high numbers of illegal immigrants, nearly 400,000
in each of the last three years.").
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006) (limiting judicial review of final orders of removal); EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACr SHEET: BIA RESTRUCTURING AND STREAMLINING
PROCEDURES (rev. ed. Dec. 8, 2004), available at www.justice.gov/eoir/press/
04/BIAStreamliningl20804.pdf (authorizing a single member of the Board of Immigration
Appeals to affirm the result of an Immigration Judge's decision without writing an opinion).
3. See, e.g., Padilla v. Ky., 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) ("However, the [Judicial Recommenda-
tion against Deportation (JRAD)] procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first cir-
cumscribed the JRAD provision in the 1952 Inmigration and Nationality Act (INA), and in
1990 Congress entirely eliminated it. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's
authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, an authority that had been exercised
to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year period prior to 1996.
Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996
effective date of these amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible
exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel
removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses." (internal citations omit-
ted)).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (DHS), IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009 (2010),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
enforcement ar_2009.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: UNITED STATES,
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more complex, with a maze of difficult regulations that govern the forms of
relief available at different stages of the removal process.5 Recognizing re-
cent changes in immigration enforcement and the severity of deportation,
this Note suggests that some groups of noncitizens in removal proceedings
ought to have heightened procedural safeguards as a matter of constitu-
tional law.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court recently drew attention to the
constitutional safeguards for noncitizens facing removal. The Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel requires
criminal defense attorneys to advise noncitizen clients about the immigra-
tion consequences of a guilty plea or conviction. Over the past two years,
this decision has led to a dramatic shift in criminal practice. It has prompted
a series of advisories for defense attorneys who represent noncitizen clients;
criminal defense offices have begun to create new positions staffed by im-
migration experts;' and state bar associations and other organizations have
sponsored training sessions to instruct defense attorneys on immigration
law. 9 Although Padilla focused on the rights of noncitizens in criminal pro-
ceedings, the Court also recognized the significant individual liberty inter-
ests for noncitizens facing removal, the decreasing avenues of immigration
relief available for noncitizens, and the growing nexus between immigra-
tion law and criminal law, the latter of which grants strong constitutional
protections to suspects and defendants.'o
Despite the recent changes to immigration law and language in Padilla
recognizing the seriousness of deportation, noncitizens in removal proceed-
ings continue to lack important procedural safeguards for a variety of rea-
sons. Historically speaking, the Supreme Court considered deportation
proceedings to be an intrinsic part of the U.S. government's sovereignty; the
Court held that the government therefore retained the power to limit the
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-united-states.
5. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 461-62 (2009) C'Outside the courts, the relationship between the President and
Congress has been defined by Congress's dramatic expansion of federal immigration law over
the course of the twentieth century through the creation of a complex, rule-bound legal code,
which has given rise to a comprehensive regulatory system.").
6. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
7. Id. at 1483.
8. IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, DUTY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL REPRESENTING AN
IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY Appendix B-1, B-2 (2010), available at
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/Resources/ IDPPadillaPracticeAdvisory4-6-10.pdf.
9. See, e.g., KATHERINE BRADY & ANGIE JUNCK, STEPS TO ADVISING A NONCITIZEN
DEFENDANT UNDER PADILLA v. KENTUCKY (2010) (discussing the scope of defense counsel's
duty and the steps required of defense attorneys in terms of immigration advice).
10. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 ("While once there was only a narrow class of deportable
offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigra-
tion reforms have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judg-
es to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation.").
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procedural rights granted to noncitizens." The expansion of procedural
rights would also entail a significant financial burden on the state; the ap-
proximate cost of providing counsel to indigent noncitizens could be as
much as $110 million per year.12 Given the negative public perception to-
wards those convicted of crimes, it is politically challenging to support
greater procedural rights for noncitizens today; the Obama Administration
has focused a significant part of its removal efforts on removing noncitizen
criminals. 3 Moreover, the relative lack of procedural rights for noncitizens
allows the government to enforce criminal or anti-terrorism priorities with-
in an administrative system that does not require that the government ex-
tend litigants the rigorous protections associated with the criminal pro-
cess.14 The government, for example, can preventively detain a suspected
terrorist for immigration violations and circumvent the pre-trial detention
requirements from criminal law.'5
Accordingly, several notable procedural weaknesses persist in removal
proceedings. First, indigent noncitizens do not have the right to court-
appointed counsel,16 a right that can be outcome-determinative given the
complexity of immigration law. One recent study found that non-detained
noncitizens in removal proceedings with counsel obtained relief in 74% of
their cases, in contrast to the 13% success rate for non-detained noncitizens
who proceeded pro se; detainees with counsel received relief in 18% of their
cases, compared to the 3% success rate for detainees who proceeded pro se.17
Secondly, noncitizens in removal proceedings also are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.'8 Under current Supreme
11. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
12. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5-16 (2009), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/
full report-part5.authcheckdam.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Brian Bennett, U.S. Steps Up Deportation Efforts for Criminal Immigrants, L.A.
TIMES, May 26, 2012 ("In an aggressive effort to boost deportations, U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement has begun to increase by nearly 25% the number of agents tasked with find-
ing and deporting illegal immigrants with criminal records, pulling 150 officers from desks
and backroom jobs to add extra fugitive search teams around the country.").
14. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration, Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement
Tools in the 'War' on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061 (2002) (describing the expanded use of
deportation to enforce anti-terrorism and criminal law priorities).
15. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97
CAL. L. REV. 693, 694-95 (2009).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006) (providing for a right to counsel at the noncitizens' ex-
pense).
17. See KATZMANN IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY GRP. & VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE
NEW YORK IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION STUDY: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/050411imnigrant.pdf.
18. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1056 (1984). The only binding evidentiary rule in
removal proceedings is that evidence be material and relevant. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c) (2009).
Hearsay is generally admissible in removal proceedings. See Matter of Grijalva, 19 I. & N. Dec.
143
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Court precedent, immigration enforcement officers are permitted to enter
private residences without search warrants or consent, arrest or detain per-
sons without warrants or probable cause,'9 and use racial profiling in im-
migration enforcement operations. 20 Thirdly, because there is no ex post
facto protection in removal proceedings, noncitizens may be deported ret-
roactively'21 If Congress alters the grounds of deportation-which Congress
has the plenary power to do 22 -the modified grounds are applicable to
events that occurred prior to and subsequent to the congressional change. 23
Finally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can initiate removal
proceedings in any immigration court in the nation, even if a noncitizen has
lived in a particular state or region for her entire life.24
Many scholars have recognized these procedural weaknesses and ar-
gued that the Constitution requires heightened procedure for all nonciti-
zens in removal proceedings, including access to some or all of these four
procedural rights. The most recent incarnation of this argument,
"crimigration," generally proceeds in two steps. Scholars begin with the as-
sumption that there are two types of constitutional procedure in the United
States, civil procedure and criminal procedure, the latter of which grants
strong constitutional safeguards to suspects and defendants. They then ar-
gue that noncitizens in removal proceedings ought to have heightened pro-
cedural safeguards as a matter of constitutional law because removal pro-
ceedings are not civil but are criminal in nature.25 This latter step can take
713, 722 (BIA 1988).
19. See Matthew Mulqueen, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Removal Proceed-
ings, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2008).
20. See Carrie L. Arnold, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 49 ARIz. L. REV. 113,
119-121 (2007).
21. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that Congress may retroactively change
removal grounds).
22. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
23. Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Under-
standing the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 -ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 294
(2008) ("[Elven if a defendant pled guilty years ago in reliance on then correct advice that she
would suffer no immigration consequences, this would not protect her from removal today
based on subsequent changes in the federal immigration laws.").
24. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (2012).
25. See, e.g., Austin T. Fragomen, The Uncivil Nature of Deportation: Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34-35 (1978) ("This Article con-
tends that deportation proceedings should be deemed 'criminal' or quasi-criminal in nature in
order to do away with the argument that constitutional safeguards do not apply to a 'civil'
proceeding."); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorpora-
tion of Criminal Justice Norms, 8 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 679, 691 (2007) (" [Ilmporting the
criminal enforcement model into immigration law without the accompanying criminal adjudi-
cation model exposes the affected noncitizens to harsh consequences without the necessary
procedural safeguards."); Markowitz, supra note 23 at 290-91 (arguing that expulsion proceed-
ings, where the government seeks to deport a lawful permanent resident previously admitted
into the United States, ought to be considered criminal proceedings); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring
the Boundaries between Immigration and Crime Control after September 111h, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 81 (2005) (analyzing the criminalization of immigration law and arguing that immigration
144 [Vol. 16
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many forms. Some scholars argue that deportation can be tantamount to a
penalty, making removal proceedings a punitive criminal proceeding, ra-
ther than a corrective proceeding.26 Others argue that immigration and
criminal law require the same level of constitutional protections because the
enforcement of immigration law is indistinguishable from criminal law; lo-
cal police are increasingly collaborating with armed administrative immi-
gration and customs officials to arrest and detain removable noncitizens.27
A middle ground "crimigration" approach has gained some support since
the Padilla decision. At least two scholars argue that because language in
Padilla supports the principle that removal proceedings occupy a middle
ground between the civil and the criminal, removal proceedings ought to
afford noncitizens some (but not all) procedural features from the criminal
process.2 8
Since proponents of "crimigration" rely on the civil-criminal dichotomy
law serves a social control function after 9/11).
26. See, e.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation As Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British
Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 116
(1999) (drawing an analogy between the British system of transportation to the American col-
onies and deportation); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Cases Make Bad Laws, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1893-94 (2000) (arguing
that deportation of LPRs should be seen as punishment and that criminal procedural protec-
tions should apply to deportation proceedings); Lisa Mendel, The Court's Failure to Recognize
Deportation As Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADvOC. 205, 207 (2000) ("In 1996, Congress enacted legislation that greatly expands the
grounds for which past crimes render lawful permanent residents deportable or 'removable'
from the United States. This Note argues that the consequences of these changes for lawful
permanent residents compel a renewed critique of the Court's view that deportation is not
punishment."); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why At Least Some of the
Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN L. REV. 305, 307 (2000) ("The
thesis of this paper is that our ordinary sensibilities are correct. People [being removed] are
being punished not only as a matter of ordinary discourse but also as a matter of law. Fur-
thermore, at least some of the constitutional safeguards that traditionally apply in the context
of criminal prosecutions must apply .... ); Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals and the 1996
Immigration Acts: A Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 245, 249 (2004)
("This Article seeks to explain how certain retroactive statutes, albeit civil in nature, can have
such punitive consequences that they should be constitutionally prohibited.") (internal foot-
notes omitted); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Re-
moval for Crimes, 27 YALE J. REG. 47, 68 (2010) ("We find that removal in fact functions as pun-
ishment and that immigration law and its enforcement infrastructure have changed to such an
extent in the past two decades that removal has become a direct consequence of many convic-
tions for noncitizens.").
27. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1084 (2004) (considering the implications of state and local enforcement of immigra-
tion law for racial profiling); Miller, supra note 25.
28. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 1461 (2011) (arguing that Padilla may give rise to a "Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment"
right to counsel in some removal proceedings that stands between the criminal requirements
of the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment right to due process); Peter L. Markowitz,
Deportation is Different (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 308, 2010), avail-
able at http://ssm.com/abstract=1666788 (arguing that "deportation is different" and there-
fore should be situated between civil and criminal proceedings).
5
Nadadur: Beyond '"Crimigration"a nd the Civil- Criminal Dichotomy -Applying Mathews v. Eldridge in the Immigration Context
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
in constitutional procedure, they often do not take into account the large
body of scholarship documenting the breakdown of this dichotomy in prac-
tice.29 Nominally civil proceedings can employ hybrid sanctioning that
blends elements of the retributive (criminal) and restorative (civil) models. 30
The means that the state employs to enforce and govern criminal and other
areas of law have converged. Officers from administrative agencies may
cooperate with local police to enforce "civil" regulations promulgated by
the very same administrative agencies." Although one would ordinarily
associate the loss of physical liberty with criminal proceedings, detention
prior to, during, and after proceedings is common in both non-criminal and
criminal proceedings. 32 Despite the flaws in the civil-criminal model, few
scholars have provided an alternative theory of constitutional procedure."
Like "crimigration," this Note suggests that some groups of noncitizens
in removal proceedings ought to have heightened procedural safeguards as
a matter of constitutional law, including the right to counsel, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the right against ex post facto
application of immigration law, and the right to have removal proceedings
in the district in which the noncitizen resides. However, this Note moves
beyond "crimigration" by recognizing that the civil-criminal procedural
model is flawed and by proposing an alternate non-bifurcated theory of
constitutional procedure based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
Due Process Clauses as interpreted in Mathews v. Eldridge.34 Under this
model, there are several specific procedural safeguards potentially available
29. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992) (discussing the breakdown of the civil-criminal dichotomy
in light of state-invoked punitive civil monetary sanctions); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and
Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 26 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
775 (1997) (discussing the destabilization of the criminal-civil distinction with reference to
punishment theory); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMIP. LEG. ISSUEs 1 (1996) (arguing that in light of the inapplicability of the civil-criminal
distinction, criminal procedure ought to be reconceptualized).
30. See Mann, supra note 29 at 1804.
31. See Wishnie, supra note 27.
32. Over the past two to three decades, there has been a significant increase in administra-
tive detention in wartime and insurrection, immigration removal proceedings, the pre and
post-arrest detention of juveniles, and the involuntary commitment of those determined to be
mentally ill. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 514-15 (2004), Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
514 (2003), Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984), and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
425-433 (1979).
33. See Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2222 (1989) (arguing for
a single non-bifurcated theory of constitutional procedure);see also Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia
Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 84 (2008) ("[W]e will propose to do
away with the civil-criminal divide in procedure altogether and replace it with a different
scheme.").
34. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews holds that the constitutionally-required procedure in a
given proceeding should strike a balance between (1) the individual interest at stake in the
proceeding, (2) the government interest, and (3) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the indi-
vidual interest and the probable value of additional process.
146 [Vol. 16
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in any proceeding, such as the right to counsel, the right to a jury trial, or
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In a given proceeding,
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments3 can re-
quire all, some, or none of these protections, depending on the balance be-
tween the three prongs of Mathews." This model, which already describes
the procedural safeguards constitutionally required in many types of pro-
ceedings, suggests that all proceedings exist across a single continuum,
with a variable level of specific procedural safeguards required, based on
the constitutional right to due process.
This Note applies this theory of constitutional procedure to three groups
of noncitizens: (1) those detained during and after removal proceedings, (2)
those for whom removal may result in stigmatization and social exclusion
in a country of origin, and (3) parents who have children in the United
States. The balance of the Mathews factors for these three groups of nonciti-
zens resembles the balance of the Mathews factors in other proceedings that
grant litigants some or all of these safeguards. The first group experiences
deprivation of the individual liberty to be free, like criminal suspects and
defendants, parolees and probationers facing revocation, and juveniles in
delinquency proceedings. The second group faces stigmatization and social
exclusion in a country of origin because of their status as deportees, similar
to the social stigmatization of those involuntarily committed by the state.
And the third group resembles parents in termination hearings: deportees
with children in the United States can have their relationship with their
child effectively terminated by the state. Assuming that the Due Process
Clause, as interpreted in Mathews, can serve as the foundation for constitu-
tional procedure, these three groups of noncitizens likely have the right to
some or all of the following safeguards: the right to counsel, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to ex post facto pro-
tection, and the right to have removal proceedings in the district in which
the noncitizen resides.
II. The Due Process Clause and Mathews as a General Procedural Doctrine
As opposed to a bifurcated civil-criminal dichotomy in procedure, there
35. This Note treats the constitutional requirement of due process as identical between the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, with the former applying to the federal government and
the latter to state governments. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123-24 ("By the Fifth Amend-
ment, [the right to due process of law] was introduced into the Constitution of the United
States as a limitation upon the powers of the national government, and by the Fourteenth, as a
guaranty against any encroachment upon an acknowledged right of citizenship by the legisla-
tures of the States."); Leonard G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1048, 1048-1050 (1968) (arguing that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments encompass similar procedural rights).
36. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
147
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are arguably three types of proceedings in the United States - civil,37 crimi-
nal, and administrative -each with their own constitutional theory of pro-
cedure. The criminal process is highly constitutionalized;38 civil law is gen-
erally governed by non-constitutional procedural doctrine and rules;39 and
in administrative adjudications, agencies must comply with Mathews v. El-
dridge,40 which interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clauses in the federal and state administrative settings.
This Part argues that the Due Process Clause, as interpreted through the
Mathews administrative test,41 may serve as a non-bifurcated model of con-
stitutional procedure in all proceedings. A survey of several types of pro-
ceedings suggests that, irrespective of a civil, criminal, or administrative la-
bel, the specific procedural safeguards granted to litigants strike a balance
between: (1) the individual interest in the proceeding; (2) the risk of errone-
ous deprivation of that interest and the probable value of additional pro-
cess; and (3) the government interest in the proceeding, including the finan-
cial costs of additional process. 42
Section L.A sets out the constitutional argument for why the Due Process
Clause can be the foundation for constitutional procedure in all proceed-
ings. Section .B discusses how this Note primarily relies on Supreme Court
precedent to conceptualize the three prongs of Mathews in immigration re-
moval proceedings and in the other types of proceedings analyzed below.
Section I.C then reviews several types of civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings to suggest that Mathews already works as a positive matter.
The Supreme Court tends to require constitutional procedural protections
on a continuum based on the Due Process Clause and the balance between
the three Mathews factors.
37. As used here, "civil" refers to proceedings that involve private civil litigants, in contrast
to criminal proceedings, where the state prosecutes an individual or entity, and administrative
proceedings, where an Executive agency adjudicates a dispute. See John Leubsdorf, Constitu-
tional Civil Procedure, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 580 (1984) (discussing the constitutional require-
ments in state and federal proceedings involving private civil litigants).
38. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.") (emphasis added).
39. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are an important example in this regard. See also
Stuntz, supra note 29, at 4 ("[T]he provision of counsel and counsel's performance, discovery,
settlements, the questioning of witnesses, the disposition of cases that don't go to the jury -all
issues that have been constitutionalized in criminal cases -are in civil cases governed by local
rules of civil procedure, by statute, by nonconstitutional common law, or by local custom.").
40. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
41. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) ("The Mathews balancing test was
first conceived in the context of a due process challenge to the adequacy of administrative proce-
dures used to terminate Social Security disability benefits.") (emphasis added).
42. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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A. The Due Process Clause and Constitutional Procedure
The Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
can require all, some, or none of the universe of specific procedural rights
available in a proceeding. These procedural rights include: the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; the privilege against self-incrimination;
the requirement that a prosecution occur in the district in which the
charged crime allegedly took place; the right against ex post facto applica-
tion of laws; the right to state-appointed counsel and the effective assistance
of counsel; the right to trial by jury; the right to testify in one's favor and
the right to not have opposing parties comment adversely on a defendant's
failure to testify; the right to compel the production of witnesses and evi-
dence in one's favor; the right to call expert witnesses; the right to be pre-
sent at trial and to confront, or cross-examine, all of the opposing party's
witnesses; the right against double jeopardy; and the right to be exonerated
if the opposing party does not meet its burden of proof.4 3 The Due Process
Clause ultimately expresses the individual's right to due process of law,
which includes the rights to fundamental fairness, to be meaningfully heard
in court, to have a fair hearing or trial,44 and the right against the arbitrary
exercise of state power.45
The Constitution, however, appears to preclude a theory of constitution-
al procedure based on the Due Process Clause; the Bill of Rights distin-
guishes criminal proceedings from all others. Nevertheless, the criminal
procedural rights in the Constitution may be seen as clarifications of what
the Due Process Clause requires, the specific safeguards necessary to pre-
serve the individual's free and fair hearing and to ensure that an individual
is not subjected to arbitrary state coercion. Writing for the majority in John-
son v. Zerbst,46 Justice Hugo Black borrowed language directly from the Due
Process Clause in conceptualizing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
43. For a summary of specific procedural rights, see Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hear-
ing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
44. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (1976) ("An additional factor to be considered here is the
fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures. . . ."); Joint Anti-Fascist Ref-
ugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Due process
"represent[s] a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly
between the individual and government.").
45. See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. *235, *244 (1819) (holding that due process is
"intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice"). See also
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 7 (1981) (" [t]he reason advanced by
a power wielder on one occasion must not be inconsistent with the reasons he advances to jus-
tify his other claims to power."); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 53 (1976) (freedom from arbitrariness builds on the principle that "like cases
receive like attention and like evidentiary development so that the influence of such arbitrary
factors as location are limited.").
46. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
9
Nadadur: Beyond '"Crimigration"a nd the Civil- Criminal Dichotomy -Applying Mathews v. Eldridge in the Immigration Context
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
[the right to counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty. . . . The Sixth Amendment . .. embodies a
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein
the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. 47
Subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence continues to voice the princi-
ple that criminal procedural rights preserve the suspect and defendant's
rights to a free and fair trial and to be meaningfully heard in court, the bed-
rock principles of the constitutional right to due process.48 Incorporation
doctrine in particular lends support to a reading of the Due Process Clause
as encompassing specific procedural safeguards. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment covers many of the criminal protections from
the Bill of Rights, making these protections applicable to suspects and de-
fendants in state criminal prosecutions. 49
The Supreme Court and several federal Circuit Courts also have read the
Due Process Clause to require criminal procedural protections in non-
criminal proceedings to protect the individual's rights to fundamental fair-
ness and against the arbitrary exercise of state power.50 In juvenile delin-
quency hearings - nominally administrative or civil proceedings - the Su-
preme Court has required virtually all of the criminal procedural
safeguards under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. 51 Similarly, the Supreme Court has extended almost all of the
47. Id. at 462-63 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in
one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.").
49. See generally Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill ofRights into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965) (discussing Su-
preme Court cases that apply provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states).
50. See Peter Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 1 U. PA. J. CONsr. L. 1299, 1351 (2011)
(" [T]here is ample precedent for selective incorporation of criminal rights into non-criminal
proceedings. Beyond the examples from the immigration realm already discussed, the Court
has applied some rights commonly associated with criminal proceedings to non-criminal pro-
ceedings, including juvenile delinquency proceedings, civil commitment proceedings, some
parole revocation proceedings, and court martial proceedings."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two
Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to
Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 69, 79 (1996) (arguing that even if cer-
tain Amendments of the Bill of Rights refer to criminal proceedings, the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments can mandate that the same safeguards apply to non-
criminal proceedings).
51. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967); see also B. J. George, Jr., Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings:
The Due Process Model, 40 U. CoLO. L. REV. 315 (1968) (noting that the Due Process Clause re-
quires notice, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation, and the privilege against self-
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procedural safeguards from the criminal process to parolees and probation-
ers facing revocation of their release.52 In the immigration context -a nomi-
nally administrative adjudication-circuit courts have held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment encompasses the right to effective
assistance of counsel, a Sixth Amendment right.53
The argument that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment can encompass specific procedural rights may be qualified to
some extent by language from Medina v. California.M In that case, the Court
observed in dicta that "[t]he Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many
aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional
guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites
undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the
careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order."55
However, the reading of the Due Process Clause proposed in this Note is
consistent with the language from Medina. This Note does not make a nor-
mative claim that criminal proceedings ought to afford greater constitu-
tional safeguards as a matter of due process, the argument that the Court
appeared to be wary of in Medina. Instead, it makes a positive claim about
criminal proceedings: the constitutional right to due process, as interpreted
in Mathews, can explain why the Constitution affords suspects and defend-
ants certain procedural rights. The constitutional right to due process also
explains why certain proceedings considered non-criminal still extend liti-
gants all the criminal procedural safeguards and why certain proceedings
extend litigants weaker procedural safeguards.
B. The Applicability of Mathews
This Note relies largely on Supreme Court precedent to conceptualize
the individual interest, the government interest, and the risk of erroneous
deprivation in removal proceedings and the other types of proceedings
analyzed below. Mathews and its progeny provide guidance on how to in-
terpret the three prongs by illustrating the types of individual interests or
government interests that are significant in conceptualizing procedural
rights. The Court, for example, has underscored that the liberty from bodi-
ly restraint is among the most significant individual interests that can be at
incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
52. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
53. See Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that noncitizens in
removal proceedings have the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth Amend-
ment); Osei v. INS., 305 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2002) (same); Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259
F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Hernandez v. Reno, 238 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (same);
Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); lavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2000) (same).
54. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
55. Id. at 443.
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stake in any proceeding. Similarly, the Court has held consistently that the
fiscal costs of the administrative process are important in understanding
the government interest prong. Accordingly, the Mathews decision has been
clarified and interpreted through the Court's process of common law deci-
sion-making. Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf emphasize the importance
of judicial precedent in conceptualizing fundamental constitutional rights,
such as the right to due process of law:
[T]he elaboration of constitutional values proceeds mostly from
prior decisions. By focusing on precedent- intended here to in-
clude the rationales of prior cases as well as their holdings-we do
not deny that other factors play a significant role in constitutional
adjudication. We single out precedent-based arguments because
such arguments generally take account of these other factors. The
Court has nominally based even its boldest innovations in constitu-
tional law upon precedent. 56
Tribe and Dorf go on to discuss the Supreme Court's institutional role in
interpreting fundamental rights. Its jurisprudence can be the best guide as
to the level of generality at which to cast constitutional rights because the
Supreme Court is the political institution tasked with interpreting the Con-
stitution and its own cases.57
Before surveying different types of proceedings to illustrate the extent to
which their procedural requirements comport with the due process model,
it is important to acknowledge two counterarguments to the use of Mathews
to analyze the requirements of the constitutional right to due process in civ-
il, criminal, and administrative proceedings. One challenge could come
from those who continue to support the civil-criminal dichotomy in proce-
dure; since Mathews may be limited to the civil or administrative contexts,
one could argue that Mathews should not be used to analyze procedure in
all proceedings. The Supreme Court, however, has already applied Mathews
to adjudicate criminal procedural rights, including in determining if the
state was constitutionally required to undertake a psychiatric evaluation of
a defendant; the Court also has applied Mathews in several civil proceed-
ings.5s This jurisprudence suggests that Mathews can be used as a general
56. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1990).
57. Id. at 1065.
58. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (applying Mathews factors to deter-
mine if the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violated a defendant's right to due pro-
cess); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (applying Mathews
to a civil dispute where the state seized property under a forfeiture statute); Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (applying Mathews to determine if a defendant was competent to stand
trial); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 667 (1980) (applying Mathews in a criminal trial to
determine the constitutionality of magistrate judges making recommendations on motions to
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vehicle through which to interpret the constitutional requirements of the
Due Process Clause.
Another recurring criticism of Mathews is that it may be susceptible to
outcome-oriented analysis; it is unclear at what level of generality to cast
the three prongs.59 To take the example addressed in the present Note, a
noncitizen's "individual interest" may be defined narrowly as the right to
remain legally in the United States. Where a noncitizen contravenes the
INA, the United States government's plenary power over its borders, a
power inherent to the country's sovereignty, 60 can allow the government to
remove the noncitizen summarily with very limited procedural rights. On
the other hand, a noncitizen's "individual interest" can be cast generally as
the family ties, property, and life that she has created in the United States
over the course of a number of years; this broader conceptualization coun-
sels in favor of relatively strong procedural rights.61
In some ways, this criticism of Mathews illustrates the difference between
rules and standards in the law.62 Unlike rules -bright-line commands that
limit the discretion of an adjudicator -standards are deliberately open-
ended, allowing an adjudicator to make a fact-specific determination. What
procedural rights should be granted to a noncitizen based on her family ties
to the United States? The three prongs of Mathews are not a rule but a flexi-
ble standard of constitutional due process that structures the discussion of
procedural rights. 63 To expect Mathews to provide a single comprehensive
definition of its three prongs is difficult in light of the nature of due process,
a right that is highly-context specific and that is "flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands."6 Moreover,
Mathews and subsequent Supreme Court articulations of that decision pro-
vide a roadmap through which to navigate the levels of generality and de-
suppress).
59. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
988 (1987) ("[Tihe problem [in procedural due process cases] is that balancing does not require
the Court to develop and defend a theoretical understanding of a constitutional provision.
Under a balancing approach, the Court searches the landscape for interests implicated by the
case, identifies a few, and reaches a reasonable accommodation among them."); Mashaw, supra
note 44, at 37-57.
60. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952).
61. For more on the levels of generality at which to understand fundamental rights, con-
sider Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The majority opinion stated that "[tlhe issue pre-
sented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy." Id. at 190. In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that "this case is about'the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right
to be let alone.'" Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
62. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 38 UCLA L. REv. 379, 379 (1985) (dis-
cussing the difference between the "bright line rule" and the "flexible standard").
63. See Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, Oh Lord, Please Don't
Let Me Be Misunderstood: Rediscovering the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2005).
64. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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cide between alternate formulations of the individual interest, the govern-
ment interest, or the risk of erroneous deprivation. In the analysis that fol-
lows, this Note uses judicial precedent to interpret the three prongs of
Mathews in removal proceedings.
C. Mathews, Due Process, and Continuum of Procedural Protections
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, as in-
terpreted in Mathews, can provide a foundation for a single non-bifurcated
constitutional theory of procedure because this model can explain proce-
dure as a positive matter. The specific safeguards required by the Supreme
Court in many legal proceedings already appear to strike a balance be-
tween: (1) the individual interest in the proceeding; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest and the probable value of additional process;
and (3) the government interest in the proceeding, including the financial
costs of additional process. 65 The subsections that follow apply the Mathews
balancing test to criminal proceedings, juvenile delinquency proceedings,
probation and parole revocation proceedings, involuntary commitment
proceedings, parental termination hearings, and property actions.
1. Criminal Procedure
The criminal process extends defendants and suspects all of the rights
listed in Section L.A66 and can be situated at the far end of a procedural con-
tinuum that varies based on the balance between the Mathews factors. Un-
der the third prong of Mathews, the government may have strong interests
in ensuring societal safety, minimizing costs, and deterring future crimes.67
These government interests, however, do not outweigh the need to mini-
mize the erroneous deprivation of significant individual interests: freedom
from the coercive power of the state and freedom from bodily restraint.
In the criminal process, the authority of the state is directed against an
individual.68 Many criminal constitutional protections equalize the playing
field and protect the individual interest to be free of coercive state power, a
fundamental democratic right. Moreover, criminal safeguards also seek to
minimize the erroneous deprivation of a related individual interest: the
freedom from bodily restraint by the state.69 As the Supreme Court noted in
65. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
66. See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other
Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 814-15 (1994).
67. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
68. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (discussing state power in the con-
text of the Fourth Amendment and searches and seizures by police officials).
69. Colb, supra note 66, at 815.
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Foucha v. Louisiana,70 this freedom is "at the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action."71 In Foucha,
the Court went on to observe that "[w]e have always been careful not to
minimize the importance and fundamental nature of the individual's right
to liberty." 72 The criminal procedural system is especially concerned with
wrongly subjecting an innocent person to incarceration.7 3
Criminal prosecutions that impose the death penalty involve a greater
interest in life under the first prong of Mathews than criminal prosecutions
that involve the right to be free from bodily restraint. The Due Process
Clause thus requires heightened procedural safeguards in state and federal
death penalty cases to minimize the risk of erroneously putting a person to
death. In a line of cases beginning with Furman v. Georgia,74 the Supreme
Court has held that the death penalty cannot be imposed in a procedural
system that creates "a substantial risk that it [will] be inflicted in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner."75 The Court has required that capital sen-
tencing schemes meet twin procedural objectives: to be "at once consistent
and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the indi-
vidual."7 6 In death penalty cases, there is an independent review of the
death sentence by either a sentencing judge or an appellate tribunal to de-
termine if the penalty is being erroneously applied in a given case.7
A potential objection to a constitutional theory of criminal procedure
based on the Due Process Clause and Mathews could be based on the lack of
variation in procedure between criminal prosecutions. Setting aside the
heightened process required in death penalty cases, "[w]hy should a person
accused of turnstile jumping, facing the prospect of a day in jail (or less),
receive the same full panoply of rights as a person accused of rape, facing
years in prison?"78 To phrase this objection in another way, the individual
interest under Mathews for the person jumping the turnstile-one day in
jail -appears to be significantly less than the person accused of rape. Nev-
ertheless, the argument thus far suggests that the Supreme Court treats the
two persons similarly for purposes of constitutional procedure.
However, the constitutional requirements of due process actually vary
for these two persons based on the balance between the individual interest
70. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
71. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
73. William Blackstone famously stated, "[bletter that ten guilty persons escape than that
one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
74. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
75. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
76. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
77. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 ("As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a
system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised
of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide
its use of the information.").
78. Markowitz, supra note 50, at 1353.
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at stake, the risk that the person is deprived of that interest, and the gov-
ernment's interest. When a person is subject to the coercive power of the
state and faces deprivation of the liberty to be free -as is the case with a de-
fendant facing prosecution for rape - the Supreme Court has held in favor
of the full panoply of criminal procedural rights.79 As the freedom from
bodily restraint begins to fall away and a defendant faces only one day in
jail, the Court has determined that there is less significant of an individual
interest at stake; therefore, there is a weaker constitutional requirement to
minimize the erroneous deprivation of that interest. For defendants facing
only one day in jail or a lesser fine, the Court has required fewer safe-
guards.s0
Additionally, there are probably criminal cases where the procedural
safeguards provided by the state grant a higher level of process than is re-
quired constitutionally by the Supreme Court, despite the balance between
a lesser individual interest such as a fine, the risk of erroneous deprivation,
and the government interest. This can be explained in part by the fact that
Mathews creates a constitutional floor; criminal proceedings that involve a
fine or lesser punishment can afford a higher level of process than is re-
quired by the Due Process Clause. Mathews also does not necessarily ex-
plain procedure in every type of proceeding in the United States. Some
criminal proceedings may fall outside of the model proposed in this Note.
For example, as Part II will demonstrate, certain removal proceedings do
not comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
2. Other Proceedings and the Individual Liberty to be Free
The Supreme Court has held on various occasions that proceedings that
adjudicate interests related to the individual liberty to be free from bodily
restraint-the most significant of interests under the first prong of
Mathews8 1 -generally afford the litigants extremely strong procedural safe-
guards.
Juvenile delinquency proceedings, which are considered non-criminal,
still extend the defendant child all of the procedural protections from Sec-
79. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (upholding the right to counsel for a de-
fendant facing a prison sentence, even if the sentence is suspended); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the accused in any criminal prosecution involving the depriva-
tion of liberty is entitled to counsel).
80. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that there is no right to counsel
where the defendant is only facing a fine and not a term of imprisonment); Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (no constitutional right to a jury trial for "petty crimes").
81. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("The pre-eminent generaliza-
tion that emerges from this Court's precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is
that such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical lib-
erty if he loses the litigation.").
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tion I.A.82 Under the third prong of Mathews, the government may have a
strong interest in ensuring societal safety, minimizing the costs of the pro-
cess, and deterring future delinquents. This government interest, however,
may be outweighed by the individual interest in juvenile proceedings,
which is comparable to that in the criminal process. Criminal and juvenile
delinquency proceedings both involve similar notions of state coercion and
the state seeking to deprive an individual of her freedom. The Supreme
Court has required strong safeguards under the Due Process Clause so that
juveniles are not erroneously subjected to these significant costs.83
Similarly, in probation and parole revocation proceedings, the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires that litigants in revocation proceedings have almost all
the protections from Section L.A, save for the right to trial by jury and the
right to counsel, the latter of which is determined on a case-by-case basis."
Under the third prong of Mathews, the government's interest is identical to
that in criminal and juvenile delinquency processes, including in ensuring
societal safety. Parole and probation revocation may afford fewer proce-
dural safeguards because these proceedings do not adjudicate as significant
an individual interest under the first prong of Mathews as the criminal and
juvenile delinquency processes. The state seeks to re-incarcerate someone
who has violated the law, who must report to a parole or probation officer,
and who has a less significant claim to be free of coercive state power. As
the Supreme Court noted in Morrisey v. Brewer, "[rlevocation deprives an
individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but
only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
parole restrictions."8 5 There also may be less risk of erroneous deprivation
because the reasons for revoking parole or probation may be related to the
original crime; the state has already afforded the parolee or probationer the
rigorous protections of the criminal process in proving her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.86
82. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (holding that the criminal "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard of proof must be applied in juvenile proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (holding that juveniles accused of crimes in a delinquency proceeding must be afforded
the same process rights as adult suspects and defendants).
83. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47 (discussing the need to provide criminal procedural safeguards to
juveniles to "prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from over-
coming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom
to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction).
84. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) ("[Tlhere will remain certain cases in
which fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that the State pro-
vide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees."); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that the state interests at stake in a parole revocation hearing-including
the administrative convenience of being able to return the individual to imprisonment-do not
outweigh the individual interest: "the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes
many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on
the parolee and often on others.").
85. Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 480.
86. Cf. id. at 480 ("Parole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposi-
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In involuntary commitment proceedings, the Supreme Court has re-
quired that those facing commitment receive many of the protections out-
lined in Section L.A, including the right to counsel for indigent individuals;
however, there are laxer evidentiary standards, and the state only has to
prove that an individual ought to be committed by clear and convincing ev-
idence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.87
This lower level of safeguards can be attributed to the fact that the indi-
vidual interest under Mathews is less significant than in cases of incarcera-
tion. Although commitment proceedings are concerned partly with free-
dom from bodily restraint, they are also focused on the individual interest
to be free from social stigmatization after release from commitment.88 The
Supreme Court has noted that there are fewer restraints placed on liberty
within a treatment facility when compared to incarceration after criminal,
juvenile delinquency, or parole/ probation revocation proceedings. 89 The
constitutional right to due process also requires fewer procedural safe-
guards in commitment proceedings because the individual has an interest
in being treated. Although rehabilitation historically was a driving force
behind the theory of criminal incarceration, the past forty years have seen a
marked increase in a purely retributive rationale. 90 The Court has empha-
sized that commitment, on the other hand, focuses on treatment of an indi-
vidual for her own benefit.91
tion of sentence. Supervision is not directly by the court, but by an administrative agency,
which is sometimes an arm of the court and sometimes of the executive. Revocation deprives
an individual not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the con-
ditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.").
87. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (holding that the state has to prove
several factors by clear and convincing evidence, including mental illness and the risk that a
person may be dangerous); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 37, 39-40 (1999) ("It is now widely accepted that the pro-
cedural due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires notice and a formal
hearing before civil commitment may occur.. .. Such a hearing requires the right to counsel,
who will be appointed if the individual is indigent, the right to notice of the proceedings, a
hearing presided over by a fair and impartial judge or hearing examiner, the right to be pre-
sent at the hearing, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present evidence and
allocation of the burden of proof to the state by clear and convincing evidence") (internal foot-
notes omitted).
88. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26 (" [I]t is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a
mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender ad-
verse social consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phenomena 'stigma' or
choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur and
that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.").
89. Cf O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) ("It is elementary that the justifica-
tion for the criminal process and the unique deprivation of liberty which it can impose re-
quires that it be invoked only for commission of a specific offense prohibited by legislative en-
actment.").
90. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 3-23 (2001).
91. Cf. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 582 ("As the trend toward state care of the mentally ill ex-
panded, eventually leading to the present statutory schemes for protecting such persons, the
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3. Parental Termination
In state and federal parental termination hearings, the Supreme Court
has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments requires less by way of the procedural protections mentioned in Sec-
tion I.A, including no right to trial by jury, looser evidentiary rules, a lesser
burden of proof,92 and a qualified right to counsel, which is determined on
a case-by-case basis. 93 Because parents still have the qualified right to coun-
sel and the right to have termination proceedings in the district in which
they reside, parental termination hearings have stronger constitutional pro-
cedure than the other proceedings analyzed infra.
The balance between the Mathews factors -and the weaker individual in-
terest at stake in parental termination hearings -explains why parental
termination hearings afford less process than criminal, juvenile delinquen-
cy, parole and probation revocation, and involuntary commitment proceed-
ings. Termination proceedings still involve the coercive power of the state;
the hearing considers whether the state can sever the legal bond between a
parent and child. But the parent is not facing detention by the state. 94 The
parent is still free to attempt to build a relationship with the child, even af-
ter the legal parent-child relationship has ended. Because the Supreme
Court has deemed the individual interest to be significant but weaker than
in the proceedings discussed supra, it has determined that the constitutional
right to due process requires less by way of procedural protection.
4. Property, Welfare, Employment, and Less Process
Under Mathews, interests less weighty than incarceration or termination
of parental rights result in fewer procedural safeguards. Because the indi-
vidual interest is less, the costs to the government of additional process be-
come a more significant factor, and there may also be higher tolerance for
the erroneous deprivation of these interests.
In cases of civil property disputes or administrative proceedings where
the state seeks to deprive an individual of her property, the constitutional
right to due process does not require that these proceedings take place be-
fore a judge; that the state does not need to provide participants with the
right to counsel; and that the burden of proof is normally preponderance of
dual functions of institutionalization continued to be recognized. While one of the goals of this
movement was to provide medical treatment to those who could benefit from it, it was
acknowledged that this could not be done in all cases and that there was a large range of men-
tal illness for which no known 'cure' existed.").
92. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982).
93. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981).
94. Id. at 25.
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the evidence. 95 These proceedings require a minimal set of procedural
rights, including notice and the opportunity to be heard in writing. 96
The same can be said of administrative proceedings for "new proper-
ty,"9 and employment termination. 98 The Court has affirmed the im-
portance of welfare benefits and employment, but it has not held that pro-
cedural protections approaching the criminal process are required; welfare
and employment termination extend litigants notice and a chance to be
heard in writing.99
Ill. THE CONSrITUTIONALITY OF PROCEDURE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Assuming that the Due Process Clause can serve as the foundation for a
theory of constitutional procedure that creates a procedural continuum
varying based on the three prongs of Mathews, removal proceedings cur-
rently require less procedural safeguards than criminal, parole and proba-
tion revocation, involuntary commitment proceedings, and parental termi-
nation hearings. Although the Supreme Court has required that termination
hearings must be conducted in the jurisdiction in which the parent resides
and that certain parents are afforded the right to counsel, noncitizens in
removal proceedings can be subject to jurisdiction anywhere in the United
States and only have a statutory right to counsel at the noncitizen's own
expense. 0 0 Noncitizens also lack the right against ex post facto application
of immigration laws and the protections of the exclusionary rule for unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by immigration enforcement officers.
This Part suggests that removal proceedings for three groups of nonciti-
zens -(1) those detained during and after removal proceedings, (2) those
for whom removal may result in stigmatization and social exclusion in a
country of origin, and (3) parents who have children in the United
States'0' -ought to be moved up the Mathews continuum. If a noncitizen in
95. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(d), 853(j) (establishing the preponderance of the evidence bur-
den of proof in civil property forfeiture proceedings); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-93
(1972) (holding that prior to the seizure of property, the state must provide adequate due pro-
cess, which only requires the opportunity for a pre-seizure hearing).
96. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80-93.
97. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733,733 (1964).
98. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) (finding that government hearing revok-
ing security clearance without giving petitioner opportunity to confront or cross-examine
"failed to comport with ... traditional ideas of fair procedure").
99. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing, the right to confront and to cross-examine, and the right
to retain representation at no expense to the government).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
101. Although this Part focuses on the due process rights of three particular groups-
instead of arguing that the Constitution requires greater procedural safeguards for all nonciti-
zens in removal proceedings -these three groups are significant to the question of the overall
constitutionality of removal proceedings; they represent a large subset of the broader popula-
tion in removal proceedings. See Sections fl.A.1, Il.B.1, and II.C.1, infra, for the numbers of
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removal proceedings can prove that she is in one of these three groups, the
Due Process Clause requires greater specific safeguards, including the right
to counsel, Fourth Amendment rights and the exclusionary rule, the right
against ex post facto application of immigration laws, and the right to have
removal proceedings in the district in which the noncitizen reside. Some of
the proceedings to which removal proceedings are compared, such as pa-
rental termination hearings, do not afford litigants all four of these safe-
guards. Nevertheless, the balance of Mathews factors for these three groups
of noncitizens resembles the balance in other proceedings where the Su-
preme Court has required that litigants have access to many or all of these
four safeguards.
As noted in Section I.B, supra, the Mathews test may be susceptible to
outcome-oriented analysis, and decision-makers may be able to mold the
three factors to support the outcome they want. To guard against this criti-
cism, this Part relies on Supreme Court precedent that either explicitly or
implicitly defines the individual interest, the government interest, and the
risk of erroneous deprivation in removal proceedings and in the other pro-
ceedings to which removal proceedings are compared. This precedent in-
cludes decisions in which the Court does not expressly apply Mathews but
nevertheless recognizes relevant features of particular groups of litigants. 102
This Part also draws on other legal sources - including statutes and interna-
tional law-and social science research that may help conceptualize the
three prongs of Mathews in the removal context.
A. Removal Proceedings and the Individual Liberty To Be Free
The INA requires the detention of certain groups of noncitizens during
removal proceedings; some noncitizens have the possibility of being re-
leased on bond while others are detained mandatorily.10 3 Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained 363,000 foreign nationals in 2010,
which means detainees form around 70% of noncitizens apprehended for
removal. 1 4 The government does not detain the other 30% of noncitizens in
removal proceedings but requires that these noncitizens report to their re-
moval hearings in immigration court.
According to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on comparable pro-
noncitizens that fit into each of these groups.
102. For example, the Court did not cite and apply Mathews in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 690 (2001). The Court held indefinite immigration detention after a final order of deporta-
tion invalid on statutory grounds. Nevertheless, the Court suggested that the freedom from
bodily restraint is a significant individual interest for noncitizens in detention. Id.
103. 8 U.S.C. §1226a (2006).
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ceedings, the Due Process Clause requires that detainees in removal pro-
ceedings have the right to counsel, the right to ex post facto protection, the
exclusionary rule applied to unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
right to have removal proceedings occur in the district in which they reside.
Under the individual interest prong of Mathews, detainees are deprived of
the individual liberty to be free, like litigants in criminal, juvenile delin-
quency, parole and probation revocation, and involuntary commitment
proceedings. Although the loss of liberty in removal proceedings is argua-
bly preventive and not punitive, the Court still requires almost all of these
procedural safeguards in cases of preventive detention. Under the second
prong of Mathews, the risk of erroneous removal is especially acute for de-
tained noncitizens because they are often deprived of liberty in remote loca-
tions, far from avenues of legal representation. Under the third prong, the
cost to the government of providing heightened safeguards to noncitizen
detainees may be offset by the fact that such safeguards could lead to great-
er efficiency.
3. The Individual Interest: The Liberty to Be Free
On the one hand, the loss of liberty for detainees in immigration re-
moval proceedings is preventive in nature. Immigration detention purport-
edly secures noncitizens for removal and ensures societal safety while pro-
ceedings are ongoing.1 05 However, the Supreme Court requires heightened
procedural safeguards in cases of preventive detention as a constitutional
due process matter. In United States v. Salerno,106 where the Court upheld
preventive detention in criminal proceedings, it emphasized that this type
of detention was only permitted with rigid constitutional safeguards, in-
cluding the rights to counsel and to cross-examine witnesses, a clear and
convincing evidence burden of proof for the government, and immediate
appellate review of the preventive detention decision by an independent
judge.107 Those committed by the state may be detained preventively, but
the Court has required access to rigid constitutional safeguards as they
await the determination of their status.108 In Zadvydas v. Davis,109 which
105. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
106. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
107. Id. at 751. See also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration De-
tention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1011 (2002) ("The Court [in Salerno] emphasized that the safe-
guards included the fact that the defendant has the rights to counsel, to testify, to proffer evi-
dence, and to cross-examine witnesses; that the government must prove its case by clear and
convincing evidence; and that an independent judge guided by statutorily enumerated factors
must issue a written decision subject to immediate appellate review.") (internal citations and
footnotes omitted).
108. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992) (finding unconstitutional preventive de-
tention in an involuntary commitment proceeding because there was no hearing to determine
if the respondent was a danger to society).
109. 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
162 [Vol. 16
22
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol16/iss1/5
2013] Beyond "Crimigration" and the Civil-Criminal Dichotomy
considered detention in immigration removal proceedings, the Court cited
Salerno to underscore the significance of the individual interest for anyone
being deprived of their individual liberty to be free; 11 0 Zadvydas, however,
did not make a constitutional holding as to which procedural rights de-
tained noncitizens ought to have in removal proceedings. Given the close
similarities between the loss of individual liberty for immigrant detainees
and other cases of detention, this Section supports such a constitutional
principle. Even if immigration detention is purely preventive, detained
noncitizens should at least have the right to counsel prior to being detained
and throughout the removal process; the Court has extended this right to
other litigants in cases of preventive detention.
Moreover, many scholars document the vindictive nature of immigra-
tion detention' -detention can be an especially harsh penalty when a
noncitizen's only violation is entering the country without inspection by
immigration authorities. In this sense, immigration detention, although
preventive in name, serves the same functional purpose as incarceration in
the criminal, juvenile delinquency, parole and probation revocation, and
involuntary commitment processes. Specifically, detention during removal
proceedings can deter violations or punish those who contravene immigra-
tion law. To the extent that immigration detention is not just preventive, the
loss of liberty in removal proceedings for detainees is the same loss of liber-
ty that the Supreme Court has recognized as the outcome of criminal, juve-
nile delinquency, parole and probation revocation, and involuntary com-
mitment processes. This outcome in the latter proceedings justifies
heightened constitutional process for litigants, including the right to coun-
sel, the right to ex post facto protection, the exclusionary rule applied to un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and the right to have removal proceed-
ings occur in the district in which they reside.
The fact that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) houses some
noncitizens in jails alongside criminal offenders underscores the similarities
between the deprivation of liberty in the immigration and criminal con-
texts.112 The loss of liberty may arguably be worse for noncitizen detainees:
[A] lawful permanent resident who is convicted of a misdemeanor
110. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 ("And this Court has said that government detention violates
that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural
protections, or, in certain special and 'narrow' nonpunitive 'circumstances,' where a special
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the 'individuals constitution-
ally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint."') (internal citations omitted).
111. See Kanstroom, supra note 26, at 1890-93.
112. About the U.S. Detention and Deportation System, DETENTION WATCH,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/aboutdetention (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (hereinaf-
ter DETENTION WATCH); FAQ Regarding Federal Immigration Detention, ESPERANZA IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www.esperanza-la.org/faq-re-federal-immigration-detention.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
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marijuana offense may be sentenced to only a few days in jail.
However, once in removal proceedings, federal law requires that
the same permanent resident be subject to mandatory detention for
the months or years it takes to complete the subsequent immigra-
tion case.l3
Parolees and probationers facing revocation also may be comparable to
detained noncitizens in removal proceedings. Some scholars suggest that
immigration status in the United States is like a contract between a nonciti-
zen and the government. When the noncitizen abides by the terms of the
contract, the United States extends her lawful status, but when the nonciti-
zen fails to abide by the terms of the contract, by committing certain crimes,
the government can revoke the contract, detain the noncitizen, and begin
removal proceedings.114 In immigration removal proceedings for former
lawful residents and in parole and probation revocation, the state's with-
drawal of a privilege given to a litigant, either immigration status in the
United States or release under supervision, leads to detention and depriva-
tion of individual liberty. For constitutional due process purposes, detained
noncitizens should be treated with at least the same procedural protections
as parolees and probationers; noncitizens can have a constitutional right to
counsel, which an administrative immigration court can determine on a
case-by-case basis.
The Court's precedent thus suggests that noncitizen detainees should
have, at the very least, all of the protections that those facing preventive de-
tention have, including the right to counsel. The Court requires the right to
counsel as a matter of constitutional due process in all proceedings that in-
volve the freedom from bodily restraint. 115 To the extent that immigration
detention serves a more retributive purpose, the constitutional right to due
process requires a greater panoply of rights, comparable to the criminal
process, including the right to counsel, the right to ex post facto protection,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right to have
removal proceedings in the district in which they reside.
2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Under the second prong of Mathews, detainees in removal proceedings
are at a high risk of being erroneously removed, which further supports the
argument that the Due Process Clause should require strong safeguards for
detainees. Because many detention centers are located in remote locations,
113. Markowitz, supra note 22, at 295.
114. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15-37 (2006).
115. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
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it may be difficult for attorneys, translators, immigrant rights organizations,
and other civil society groups to travel to facilities to assist noncitizens in
presenting claims for relief.1 6 Libraries at immigration detention facilities
may consist of limited and outdated legal resources." 7 Legal resources also
are often only in English, which can pose an obstacle for many detainees
who are not fluent in the language.
Detainees also may not be able to conduct the detailed fact-finding nec-
essary to present defenses to removal. Noncitizens claiming asylum or re-
lief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) must present extensive
evidence of political and social conditions in their countries of origin.s18
This fact-finding is likely difficult when confined and is apt to be particular-
ly challenging for indigent detainees who lack the assistance of counsel.119
The current system thus risks sending detained noncitizens to persecution
or torture simply because they are unable to research and present claims.
Finally, detention may exact a significant psychological toll on nonciti-
zens, "creat[ing] an incentive for [them] to forego pursuing procedural
rights or valid claims that may prolong the length of detention."120 Ap-
pointing detainees counsel or giving them the right against being trans-
ferred to remote locations for their removal proceedings would improve the
accuracy of the removal determination.
3. The Government Interest
Opponents of heightened constitutional safeguards in removal proceed-
ings often invoke costs to the government. Appointing counsel for detain-
ees - or for any of the categories of noncitizens discussed infra - would un-
doubtedly entail significant administrative costs. Recognizing the right
against ex post facto application of immigration laws and the right to have
removal proceedings occur in the district in which a noncitizen resides may
result in litigation to challenge the conduct of removal proceedings that do
not comply with these requirements. There are also broader societal costs of
extending the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to noncitizen detain-
ees. Because certain evidence may be barred from removal hearings, noncit-
izens that ought to be deported under the INA could be able to remain in
116. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN
THE U.S.A. 32 [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL] (2009), available at http://
www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf.
117. Stephanie Lan Chin, Library Services in U.S. Immigration Detention Facilities 80
(2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, San Jose State University), available at
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4751&context=etd theses.
118. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2009) (regulation on eligibility for asylum); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16
(2009) (regulation on eligibility for withholding of removal under the CAT).
119. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 116, at 31.
120. Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceed-
ings, 4 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 113, 129 (2008).
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the United States.
However, these costs can be weighed against the government's shared
interest with the noncitizen in not wrongfully removing her.121 Granting
greater procedural rights can improve the accuracy of removal determina-
tions, ensuring that noncitizens with the substantive right to remain in the
United States are allowed to do so.'2 This is especially significant in cases
of noncitizen detainees petitioning for asylum or relief under the CAT. In-
ternational human rights law enshrines the shared interest of the United
States in ensuring that this group is not sent to persecution or torture.123
Similarly, having the right to counsel or the right to have removal pro-
ceedings in the district in which the detained noncitizen resides could lead
to fewer administrative costs. By being close to home, noncitizen detainees
can conduct the fact-finding necessary for their claims. By having counsel,
"cases are better presented and argued, and briefs, motions, and in-court
proceedings are more likely to conform to rules of procedure."124 A 2004
study conducted by the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that
noncitizens represented by counsel were able to clearly identify contested
issues in well-written briefs; this potentially reduced the time needed to re-
solve issues.'" The constitutional right to counsel thus could lead to shorter
detentions and decrease the annual cost of detention from $1.7 billion.126
Immigration judges also would not need to expend time and resources con-
sidering pro se filings; such filings currently lead to greater administrative
costs because judges have to construe pro se claims broadly and inde-
pendently consider all the evidence on the record.127
Ultimately, heightened procedure actually decreases costs to the gov-
ernment in some areas, and the administrative costs do not necessarily
outweigh the government's shared interest in accurate adjudication of the
detainees' immigration claims. The balance between the three prongs of
Mathews suggests that the Due Process Clause requires heightened constitu-
tional safeguards for noncitizen detainees, including the right to counsel,
121. Cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("Since the State has an urgent
interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the parent's interest in an accurate and just deci-
sion.").
122. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 116, at 30-31.
123. See, e.g., Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
Div., §2242, 112 Stat. 2681-764, 822 (announcing the policy of the United States "not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there
are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture").
124. Kaufman, supra note 120, at 145.
125. BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE BIA PRO BONO PROJECT Is
SUCCESSFUL 10,13-14 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/reports/BIAProBono
ProjectEvaluation.pdf.
126. DETENTION WATCH, supra note 109.
127. See Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that immi-
gration judges and the BIA have a legal obligation to construe pro se briefs "as having suffi-
ciently made the arguments relevant to the issues raised by his claims").
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the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the right against ex
post facto application of immigration law, and the right to have removal
proceedings in the district in which they reside. The Constitution requires
all of these rights for litigants in the criminal, juvenile delinquency, parole
and probation revocation, and involuntary commitment processes. Fur-
thermore, the Constitution extends many of these rights to defendants fac-
ing preventive detention.
B. Removal Proceedings and Social Stigmatization
This Section applies the Mathews test to noncitizens that face stigmatiza-
tion and social exclusion in a country of origin because of their status as
deportees. As discussed infra in sub-section III.B.1, some social science re-
search suggests that deportees to Central America, particularly El Salvador
and Mexico, face significant stigmatization. In 2010, the Department of
Homeland Security removed 8,315 criminal deportees to El Salvador and
127,728 to Mexico.128
If a litigant can show that she will experience stigmatization and social
exclusion in a country of origin, the Due Process Clause requires that she
have heightened safeguards comparable to the procedural safeguards
granted by the Supreme Court in involuntary commitment proceedings, in-
cluding the right to counsel and the right to have the proceeding in the dis-
trict in which the noncitizen resides. Under the first prong of Mathews, the
individual interest is comparable to involuntary commitment proceedings,
which involve the individual liberty to be free from social stigmatization
after commitment. Additionally, the second and third prongs of Mathews
counsel in favor of higher procedural safeguards based on similar issues to
those discussed supra in Sections II.A.2 and II.A.3.
1. The Individual Interest: Stigmatization and Social Exclusion
A person who has been committed by the state potentially faces a life of
restricted economic choices and social exclusion, which can be traced to the
state labeling the person as sick and deviant through the commitment pro-
ceeding. 129 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause as
128. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (DHS), YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95-96 (2010),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois-yb_2010.pdf.
Criminal deportees to Mexico and El Salvador are likely a subset of those detained. The Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA) requires mandatory detention for those with certain crimi-
nal convictions.
129. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1272 (1974) ("[Tlhe
individual may be confined indefinitely, and, if he is released, the lingering stigma of mental
illness may handicap him in maintaining personal relationships, in finding a job, and in gain-
ing admission to school.").
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requiring strong procedural safeguards for those being committed because
of the significant psychological trauma caused by this post-release experi-
ence.130 Stigmatization of deportees, which operates at two levels, can be
comparable to those who have been involuntary committed: (1) internal,
first-person stigmatization, and (2) external, state and society stigmatiza-
tion.131 The Due Process Clause thus requires similar levels of procedural
safeguards in commitment and certain removal proceedings.
As to the former type of stigmatization, some deportees experience psy-
chological trauma having been labeled by the United States government as
outsiders, unqualified to be part of American society; this is similar to the
experience of persons who feel abnormal or deviant because the govern-
ment has forced them outside of society into a mental treatment facility. 132
In the first chapter of Nations of Emigrants, sociologist Susan Coutin discuss-
es the psychologically transformative effects of removal on "retornados,"
deportees from the United States to El Salvador:
Through removal, people who have complex belongings to multi-
ple communities are stripped of certain memberships . . . .
Retornados undergo a rite of passage in which they discover they
are "owned," in a sense by the legal constructs that document their
existence. In fact, through detention and deportation, they actually
become the physical beings that correspond to these legal con-
structs, and they are barred from the United States, the country
with which they may most closely identify. 133
In addition to internal stigmatization, residents and the government in a
country of origin may reject deportees and particularly criminal depor-
tees.134 Deportees are often readily identifiable based on their individual
characteristics, including clothing, language, American mannerisms, and
government-issued identification indicating their deportee status.135 In
Mexico and Central America, deportees often are physically harassed and
abused or refused from jobs because they are perceived as causing gang vi-
130. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979).
131. Cf. David C. Brotherton & Luis Barrios, Displacement and Stigma: The Social-
Psychological Crisis of the Deportee, 5 CRIME MEDIA & CULTURE 29, 35-52 (2009) (analyzing the
stigmatization experience of Dominican deportees after removal from the United States).
132. See Note, supra note 129.
133. SUSAN B. CouTIN, NATIONS OF EMIGRANTS: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP IN EL
SALVADOR AND THE UNITED STATES 18 (2007).
134. The Immigration and Nationality Act acknowledges some of the effects of this stigma-
tization. Consider the concept of "voluntary departure," where a noncitizen concedes remova-
bility but can return to a country of origin on her own. A noncitizen that opts for voluntary
departure can avoid being sent back with other deportees and being made to register with
their home governments as official deportees. See 12 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006).
135. See, e.g., Brotherton & Barrios, supra note 131, at 44 ("[Nlative Dominicans can often
spot a deportee from afar, their dress, their walk, their language, all give them away.").
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olence and political instability. 136 Criminal deportees to Mexico may face
especially acute social exclusion given the perception that they are respon-
sible for growing drug violence, particularly in recent years.137 In El Salva-
dor, the government has actively equated deportees with gangsters, and of-
ficials have targeted deportees for random strip searches and
imprisonment.138 Other residents in Central America and Mexico may per-
ceive deportees as those who abandoned a country and who now return,
burdening a society that is already devoid of economic opportunity.139 As
Coutin notes:
[Retornados to El Salvador] are denied or stripped of legal status in
the United States, made ineligible for visas to reenter the United
States, and sent back to El Salvador not as heroic citizens whose
remittances saved the country from financial ruin, but rather as
failed 6migr~s likely to enter the ranks of the unemployed, the im-
poverished, and the criminal. They are considered by many to be a
burden on their country of origin ... 140
Ultimately, the individual interest in removal proceedings that involve
issues of stigmatization and social exclusion is comparable to the individual
interest at stake in involuntary commitment proceedings. If a noncitizen
proves that she will experience such stigmatization after removal, the con-
stitutional right to due process requires greater procedural safeguards. Re-
moval proceedings for this group should be moved up the Mathews contin-
uum and at least guarantee noncitizens the right to counsel, which is
granted to litigants in involuntary commitment proceedings.
This conclusion may be limited by the difficulties in measuring and
proving stigmatization. How does an immigration court or other legal body
determine if a noncitizen deserves heightened procedural safeguards be-
136. See Clifford Griffin, Criminal Deportation: The Unintended Impact of U.S. Anti-Crime and
Anti-Terrorism Policy Along Its Third Border, 30 INST. OF CARIBBEAN STUD. 39, 42-43 (2002).
137. The government in Mexico increasingly perceives deportees as contributing to the
drug wars and violence in the border regions. See Mark Stevenson, Mexican President: U.S. Puts
'Absurd Curbs on Migration,' 'Persecute[s] Migrants,' 'Violates Their Human Rights,' ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 23, 2011), available at http://cnsnews.com/news/article/mexican-president-U.S.-
puts-absurd-curbs-migration-persecutes-migrants-violatestheir.
138. See M. Kathleen Dingeman & Rub6n G. Rumbaut, The Immigration-Crime Nexus and
Post-Deportation Experiences: En/Countering Stereotypes in Southern California and El Salvador, 31
UNIv. LA VERNE L. REv 363, 389 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights Law:
Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Necessity? 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 219 (2007) ("The [Salvadorean]
national police began a program of detaining, interviewing and recording information about
the deportees. Fear of these Americanized young men and social prejudice have impeded their
ability to find jobs and to integrate into Salvadoran society.").
139. See Dingeman & Rumbaut, supra note 138 at 395 (2010) ("Fearful that they would be
perceived as failed 6migres, most initially attempted to control information about their depor-
tation status, preferring that only close friends and relatives know the truth of their story.").
140. COuTIN, supra note 133, at 33.
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cause she will experience stigmatization and psychological trauma result-
ing from social exclusion? The answer to this question is highly individual-
and fact-specific, and is further complicated by the lack of social science lit-
erature studying the experience of deportees after removal. 141
At the very least, the analysis presented in this Section suggests that
there is a segment of deportees that deserve heightened constitutional pro-
cess; courts ought to consider the individual experience of these deportees
when determining the process required. More social science studying the
experience of deportees after deportation can help develop this argument
further by revealing which sets of individuals are especially at risk.
2. The Other Two Prongs of Mathews and Stigmatization
For those facing stigmatization and social exclusion, the risk of errone-
ous deprivation and the government interest are similar to those discussed
supra, in Sections II.A.2 and II.A.3. Therefore, these two prongs support the
conclusion that noncitizens facing stigmatization deserve the rights to
counsel and to have removal proceedings in the district in which the noncit-
izen resides - two rights that the Court has required as a constitutional due
process matter for those facing involuntary commitment. The risk of being
removed erroneously may be especially high for this group of noncitizens
because some of them claim immigration relief in removal proceedings as
asylees or under the CAT; social stigmatization and exclusion can be
grounds for substantive immigration relief. 142 Presenting these types of
claims can be difficult without counsel or other legal assistance because it
requires an understanding of particular country conditions, the cultural cir-
cumstances that lead to social exclusion, and the ability to translate this fac-
tual material into legally cognizable language. 143 Heightened procedure can
help minimize the risk that this group of noncitizens is erroneously deport-
ed from the US.
As for the third prong of Mathews, the government still shares an interest
in ensuring that deportees are not wrongfully sent back to a country where
they are stigmatized, ostracized, and excluded. This government interest
draws on international legal obligations. 144 Granting heightened procedure
141. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text for examples of this social science
scholarship.
142. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13-16 (2009).
143. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 116 at 31.
144. See United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, Art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 152 (defining "refugees" as persons who have a "well-founded fear of being persecut-
ed" in a country of origin, with persecution encompassing stigmatization and social exclu-
sion); MATHEW PRICE, RETHINKING ASYLUM 135 (2009) (defining "persecution" to include
claims based on social exclusion and mistreatment when perpetrated by government agents);
Amy Shuman & Carol Bohmer, The Stigmatized Vernacular: Political Asylum and the Politics of
Visibility/Recognition, 49 J. FOLKORE RESEARCH 199, 207 (identifying social stigmatization as a
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to the group of noncitizens facing stigmatization or social exclusion can
promote accurate adjudication and protect the government interest to not
wrongfully deport a noncitizen.
C. Removal Proceedings and Termination of Parental Rights
This Section applies the Mathews balancing test to noncitizen parents
who have children in the United States and who thus face the effective ter-
mination of their parental rights as a result of deportation. Although DHS
does not keep statistics on parents in removal proceedings with children in
the United States, a recent report produced by the International Human
Rights Law Clinic at the University of California, Berkeley concluded that
"more than 100,000 children have been affected by parental deportation be-
tween 1997 and 2007, and ... at least 88,000 of these children were United
States citizens."145
If parents can show that they have children residing in the United States,
the Due Process Clause requires that they at least have a qualified right to
counsel and the right to have the removal hearing in the jurisdiction in
which the parent resides, two rights that the Supreme Court has required in
termination proceedings. Under the first prong of Mathews, the individual
interest in removal proceedings for noncitizen parents is comparable to pa-
rental termination hearings. The second and third prongs also support
higher procedural safeguards, and the government has an especially strong
shared interest in safeguarding the parent-child bond.
1. The Individual Interest: Parental Rights
Deportation can effectively terminate the relationship between a parent
and child; after removal, a parent separated by hundreds of miles, a territo-
rial border, or an immigration bar to lawfully returning to the United States
may not be able to serve as a parent.14 One could argue that the termina-
tion hearing differs from removal proceedings because in the former situa-
tion, the state seeks to end the legal right of a parent over a child whereas
form of persecution).
145. INTL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC UC BERKELEY, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY & IMMIGRATION CLINIC UC DAVIS, IN THE CHILD'S BEST
INTEREST? THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT TO DEPORTATION 4
(March 2010), available at http://www.1aw.ucdavis.edu/news/images/childsbestinterest.pdf
[hereinafter IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST].
146. See S. Adam Ferguson, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the Termination of Pa-
rental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 102 (2007) ("Nevertheless, for parents facing possible
termination, the decision is not one for immigration courts to make. For these parents, leaving
their children behind is not a choice; it is mandated by state policy. . . . By failing to recognize
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the latter does not make a legal pronouncement about the parent-child rela-
tionship. But the consequences of both proceedings are the same: the state
takes action that separates a parent from a child and prevents a parent from
guiding the upbringing of the child. Additionally, in the termination pro-
ceeding, the parent has neglected a child, and the termination is meant to
safeguard the child's well-being. This child-protective rationale does not
apply to removal proceedings, where the parental termination is a collateral
effect of deportation.
Deportation has a particularly negative effect on the children of depor-
tees, which means that a noncitizen parent in removal proceedings argua-
bly has a stronger interest at stake than the parent in a termination proceed-
ing. One recent study that quantified the adverse effects of deportation on
United States-citizen children found that parents' deportation adversely
impacts children's psychological well-being, financial capability, and ability
to form meaningful relationships with other children of their age.147 Several
qualitative and quantitative studies have confirmed the adverse psycholog-
ical and financial consequences of parental deportation on children left be-
hind.148 To the extent that deportation can be compared to incarceration -
because deportation also prevents the parent from being free in the US and
raising her child-data on criminal incarceration shows that "children of
incarcerated parents are much more likely to experience psychological dis-
orders and to exhibit behavioral problems. Children of incarcerated parents
are more likely to experience trouble in school, including poor grades and
behavioral problems, than children of non-incarcerated parents."149 Because
the noncitizen parent has a strong interest in ensuring that her child is not
subjected to these significant costs, the Due Process Clause requires height-
ened procedure for her.
An additional reason why the individual interest in a parental termina-
tion hearing is akin to the interest at stake in removal proceedings for
noncitizen parents is that the former is an involuntary termination; it is one
of the few proceedings where the state affirmatively severs family ties and
ends a family relationship. In almost all family law contexts, such as di-
vorce, the proceeding is not involuntary; two private individuals are in the
proceeding, and an individual, not the state, petitions the court for the dis-
147. Kalina Brabeck & Qingwen Xu, The Impact of Detention and Deportation on Latino Immi-
grant Children and Families: A Quantitative Exploration, 32 HISP. J. OF BEHAv. Sci. 341,354 (2010).
148. See, e.g., RANDY CAPPS ET AL., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, PAYING THE PRICE: THE
IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION RAIDS ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN 54 (2007), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 411566-immigration raids.pdf (studying three com-
munities where workplace raids occurred and finding that consequences for children included
financial hardship, feelings of abandonment, symptoms of trauma, fear, isolation, depression,
and family fragmentation); IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST, supra note 145, at 5-9 (analyzing the
costs of detention and deportation of LPR parents and the adverse emotional and physical im-
pact on children in the United States).
149. IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST, supra note 145, at 5.
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solution of the family relationship. Deportation, like involuntary parental
termination, similarly involves the state acting to remove a noncitizen from
the United States, severing her family relationships in this country.
Based on this reasoning, all noncitizens who can prove family ties to the
United States potentially deserve heightened constitutional process; paren-
tal termination, the only proceeding that involves the state terminating a
family relationship against the parent's will, grants litigants the right to
counsel and the right to have proceedings in the district where the parent
resides. At the very least, the Due Process Clause requires that parents who
have children in the United States ought to have these two safeguards.
2. The Other Two Prongs of Mathews and Parental Termination
For parents facing removal, the risk of erroneous deprivation prong is
comparable to the discussion supra, in Section II.A.2, which supports the
conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires heightened procedure for
noncitizens with children in the United States. Without counsel, parents
will have difficulty articulating claims for relief; there may not be accurate
adjudication of their case, and there may be erroneous termination of their
parental rights to children in the United States. By having removal proceed-
ings in remote locations, parents will not be able to conduct the fact-finding
necessary for their claims.
Under the third prong of Mathews, the government again has a possible
administrative interest in extending greater procedure to a parent. In addi-
tion to creating a more efficient and accurate adjudication, the government
can potentially save the costs that it could eventually incur when it has to
counsel a child or place a child in foster care after removal of her parent.
The government also shares the parent's interest in the parent avoiding
deportation and retaining parental rights, especially where the child is a
United States citizen or has lawful status in the United States. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized the family and social connections that
noncitizens have to the United States, 150 and emphasized the sanctity of the
parent-child relationship.151 The INA also recognizes the importance of the
150. For example, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court ordered the release of two former Legal
Permanent Residents (LPRs), Zadvydas and Ma, detained indefinitely after receiving final re-
moval orders. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). While the Court's analysis did not mention the roots that
Zadvydas and Ma had in the United States, Martin argues that their former LPR status, with
the ties that this status involves, may best explain the holding in the case. See David A. Martin,
Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v Da-
vis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47.
151. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, (1972) ("It is plain that the interest of a parent
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'comels] to this
Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements."') (internal citation omitted); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("[Tihe history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This pri-
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parent-child relationship. Eligibility for lawful permanent resident status
corresponds to family ties to the United States,152 and noncitizens in remov-
al proceedings may be eligible for cancellation of removal, which requires a
certain residency period and proof of significant family connections to this
country. 53 Additionally, the United States is party to international treaties
that affirm the importance of preserving the relationship between parents
and children.'1
The Obama Administration recently affirmed the government's strong
shared interest with noncitizen parents facing removal. Through adminis-
trative regulation, the President announced that undocumented immigrants
facing removal who have United States-citizen children or spouses can re-
main in the United States while seeking a waiver of the three-to-ten-year
ban that potentially applies to their future legal immigration to the United
States.s55 Prior to this change, undocumented immigrant parents and
spouses were required to return to their countries of origin without know-
ing whether they qualified for a waiver or whether they would have to wait
three to ten years before returning to the US.
Accordingly, the strong shared interests between noncitizen parents and
the US government, recognized by President Obama's new regulation,
support granting noncitizen parents heightened procedural safeguards as a
matter of constitutional due process, including the right to counsel and the
right to have removal proceedings in the district where the noncitizen re-
sides; these two rights are granted to parents in parental termination hear-
ings. By granting noncitizen parents these two rights, the government can
more accurately adjudicate removal and attempt to ensure that the nonciti-
zen is not wrongfully deported away from her child.
IV. CONCLUSION
Noncitizens placed in removal proceedings potentially face the most se-
vere of penalties: permanent expulsion, away from family, friends, and a
life built over decades. As the Supreme Court observed in 1945, "although
deportation technically is not criminal punishment, it may nevertheless vis-
it as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to pursue a vocation or
a calling.. . . [Dleportation may result in the loss of all that makes life worth
mary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925) (holding that the "liberty of parents and guardians" in-
cludes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.").
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
153. 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2006).
154. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3.
155. Julia Preston, Tweak in Rule To Ease a Path to Green Card, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2012 at Al.
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living." 156 Noncitizens in removal proceedings, however, continue to lack
important procedural safeguards. They do not have the right to counsel, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the right against the ex
post facto application of immigration law, and the right to have removal
proceedings in the district in which they reside.
Although a wealth of literature recognizes these procedural weaknesses,
the recent "crimigration" trend in the literature continues to approach re-
moval proceedings from the perspective of the civil-criminal procedural di-
chotomy. Assuming that there are two types of constitutional procedure in
the US-civil and criminal-scholars argue that noncitizens in removal
proceedings ought to have heightened procedural safeguards as a matter of
constitutional law because immigration removal proceedings ought to be
classified as criminal or quasi-criminal.
This Note attempted to move beyond "crimigration" and the civil-
criminal procedural dichotomy by proposing an alternate non-bifurcated
theory of constitutional procedure based on the Due Process Clause as in-
terpreted in Mathews v. Eldridge. Under this model, the constitutional right
to due process may require a variable level of specific procedural safe-
guards in any proceeding, depending on the balance between the individu-
al interest at stake, the government interest, and the need to minimize the
erroneous deprivation of the individual interest.
Based on this theory, this Note suggested that the Due Process Clause
may require heightened procedural rights for three groups of noncitizens:
(1) those detained during and after removal proceedings, (2) those for
whom removal may result in stigmatization and social exclusion in a coun-
try of origin, and (3) parents who have children in the United States. The
balance of the Mathews factors for these three groups closely resembles the
balance of the Mathews factors in other proceedings that grant litigants the
right to counsel, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
right to ex post facto protection, or the right to have removal proceedings in
the district in which the litigant resides.
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